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With diatoms—globally abundant single cell algae—as both a model and an 
extreme example of diversity among a single species, Radical Bioethics examines 
narrow constructions of human diversity as a failure of imagination and a refusal to 
recognize disability as another instance of difference. Along with other disciplines, 
bioethics has been slow to consider its biases, inherited from a history of social 
constructions, against people with disability. Both desire and desiderata offer an 
alternative to harms committed against people with disability in matters relating to 
initiatives that foster their inclusion as critical participants in and rightful recipients 
of the commonweal.
Keywords: Bioethics, desire, desiderata, disability, diversity, historical consciousness, 
theological anthropology, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disability, World Health Organization
1. Introduction
Knowingly or not, disability in the human community is a global reality about 
which too few register a thought concerning its prevalence. As a result of this 
unrecognizability, this failure to register, too few people without immediate experi-
ence of or any regular encounter with persons with disability remain unconcerned 
with this largest and most diverse minority of people across the globe (by the 
World Health Organization estimates, at least 15% of Earth’s human population). 
Moreover, the likelihood of able-bodied/able-minded persons joining this minority 
increases with age if not by accident or by diagnosis of, for example, Alzheimer’s 
Disease, arthritis, depression, diabetes, heart disease, mental illness, multiple 
sclerosis, Parkinson’s, and other conditions. No geographic location is immune 
from this prevalence, particularly in relation to the vicissitudes of contemporary 
life—for example, travel, trudgery, terrorism. Unsurprisingly, both poverty and 
place of residence both increase and exacerbate the vulnerability to being born with 
or acquiring a disability in one’s lifetime. My focus on “Radical Bioethics” offers one 
response to a dearth of theo-ethical and bioethical reflection on a critical concern 
for this population. This concern includes the requirements of justice that have been 
largely ignored in the vein of care for the support and development of basic human 
functioning capabilities that are available in the common good, the means of which 
“commons” would be distributed with a preferential justice and safeguard for 
persons and communities of people with disability [1].
The ethics of critical medical and essential health care for people with disability 
remains under-considered explicitly, except perhaps as an aside to the focus of 
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research in bioethics and healthcare ethics more broadly. Nevertheless, a growing 
number of academics in the humanities and social sciences recognize the need 
for bioethical, philosophical, and religio-theo-ethical reflection on the subject of 
disability. Many have begun to notice and reflect upon the ways in which people 
with disability have been ignored and/or grossly underestimated as participants in 
and rightful recipients of the commonweal: the common goods of health, educa-
tion, recreation, employment, commerce, social and political affairs, and religious 
observance.
What follows continues work I have done on theological anthropology, explor-
ing the diversity of creation, and the radical dependence that characterizes all 
people—not singularly or especially people with disability but—a dependence that 
characterizes all people, from the most robust to the infirmed. Such dependence 
raises critical questions of procedure in theological ethics, bioethics, and health-
care. Among the obstacles frequently encountered in this work are the persistent 
attitudes, notably identified by the social constructions of disability, that preclude 
many initiatives that would attend to both critical and basic health care for people 
with disability. Nevertheless, and even as most are not likely to have been exposed 
to the histories of the many tragic and rather appalling experiences that people with 
disability have endured, the good news is as important as the sad and scandalizingly 
brutal treatment people with disability have received at the hands of their caregiv-
ers, communities, and medical professionals in addition to abuse from strangers. 
Thus, as more people with disability participate today in many different settings 
where previously they had been excluded de rigueur, nondisabled people have 
become more accustomed to both casual and commercial interactions with them; 
my hope is to further the work of removing the obstacles to care and the inclusion 
of people with disability throughout the commons of human encounter.
In this essay I offer a broad look at the current lack of sustained attention in 
bioethics to the social forces and inherited assumptions that the field has failed to 
recognize particularly in an unexamined critique of its power and influence to shape 
the medical and social imaginary. Before entering into bioethics, I offer two precises, 
first a theological anthropology of radical dependence and second why radical bio-
ethics –both viewed through a lens that includes an often-overlooked history of the 
experiences that people with disability have endured over the millennia. Theology 
undergirds the challenge of wholesale inclusion of people with disability in the 
main as well as in considerations of how people with disability are to be engaged in 
participatory bioethics like other moral agents in their exercise of autonomy and 
self-determination. I then explore the contours of a radical bioethics as it is rooted 
in principles with which I approach bioethics, namely, a radical posture and proc-
lamation that people with disability are people first. I move then to difference and 
diversity as key to the root of the participation of people with disability in the com-
mons and the professions. I conclude with a desiderata-like meditation on a radical 
embrace of flourishing for all.
2. A theological anthropology of radical dependence
People with disability and the non-disabled belong to a common humankind 
that is deigned the imago Dei and in which, through the Kenosis, God identifies 
with all human joys and sorrows, births and growth, disability and deaths, as well 
as the past and the future. As imago Dei, humankind takes its primary data from 
the Christian tradition’s teaching on creation, the Incarnation, and Trinitarian the-
ology. The implications of this theology extend beyond a facile nod to the identifi-
cation of God with humankind: if the Trinity is the theo-anthropological ground 
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of being human, then the Trinitarian symbol of God must function as a template 
for all divine and human affairs [2]. The critical importance of a Trinitarian 
theological anthropology cannot be overstated. If the datum of the tradition is to 
be believed, then we must be earnest in engaging with God and with one another 
along the lines of relationship and relationality that is the manifest expression of 
God for Us [3].
The Christian tradition has long discussed and defended the doctrine of the 
Trinity and the Trinity’s action in the world as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
However, the Trinity carries doctrinal importance beyond the formulaic introduc-
tion to prayer: the doctrine of the Trinity holds the potential of transformative 
practice among believers and nonbelievers alike. If every person is created in the 
image and likeness of God, and as God has been revealed to us in triune relational-
ity in se and ad extra, then relationality—not isolating autonomy or dogged self-
reliance—is the form of the imago Dei.
“Trinitarian theology is the language of relationality par excellence” [4]. not only 
in se but ad extra for us and for our salvation. The relationality that subsists within 
the Trinity is a relationality of a willed quasi-dependence of the Three Persons in 
One God. We Christians do not know God in any other way than in this Tri-Personal 
Relationality. This relationality is as God wills it to be in salvation history, in se and 
ad extra dependent in form and matter though uniquely unified and subsistent in 
effects: “the economic trinity is the immanent trinity and vice versa” [5]. It is thus 
in se wherein God enjoys/relates in God’s own company and ad extra wherein God 
enjoys/relates to all that God has wrought for us—the symbol of a relational God 
functions.
“That symbols are signs is certain: they are expressions that communicate a 
meaning; this meaning is declared in an intention of signifying which has speech as 
its vehicle” [6]. Christian theology speaks of God in the terms of an I-Thou relation-
ship. If the symbol of God functions in a vehicle of relationality and to be in relation 
suggests dependence within the one and the three, then relational dependence holds 
first place in the ways that we are to envision the imago Dei.
Of course, dependence in inter- and intra- Trinitarian relationality differs 
exponentially from the dependence experienced by the imago Dei, nevertheless 
dependence is in this anthropology relieved of its burdensome negative con-
notations. Dependence in this sense is neither a bad word nor a bad idea. It is, 
alternately, liberative. I am suggesting that unity in diversity translates to the imago 
Dei as radical dependence, human dependent relationality: we human beings are 
dependent upon God and upon one another from our conceptions and births, 
through childhood, adolescence and adulthood (to think otherwise is foolhardy) 
[7]. This symbol of God for us expresses intentional relationality as the ontological 
ground for understanding the function of the symbol that is the imago Dei rightly 
inclusive of every manifestation of God’s creative incarnate sanctifying love or 
wrongly exclusive of any.
In this theology, relations exist on account of difference. God is conceptualized 
through a medium of difference or diversity as the Trinity of Divine Persons, dif-
ferent and related: God as Father and Creator, God as Son and Incarnate Word/Jesus 
of Nazareth/the Risen Christ of Faith, and God as Holy Spirit and Transcendent 
Love within the Godhead and to all the world. “The mystery of God is revealed in 
Christ and the Spirit as the mystery of love, the mystery of persons in communion 
who embrace death, sin, and all forms of alienation [e.g., difference] for the sake of 
life” [8]. In Christian terms, the only way for us to know God is through God’s own 
self-disclosure as the divine being in relation with Godself in Trinitarian union and 
in relation with the rest of creation and perhaps we human beings in particular, in 
anthropological terms. As beings created in God’s own image, we human beings are 
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known only in relation to God and to one another: our self-knowledge is dependent 
on the diversity of persons and all other beings and things in the world.
I propose that we take difference or diversity as the key to our being in the world 
and in relationality with all reality thereby. While we may hesitate to consider 
disability as the sine qua non condition of humankind, it behooves us to recognize 
diversity and the dependence that attends to all beings and to all of our relation-
ships, of intimate and of distant or impersonal kinds. This dependence on “the 
other”—all too frequently assumed true especially (only?) for people with dis-
ability—unfolds in both deliberate and indeliberate ways, by choice or by literal or 
figurative accident. However, whatever our present status on the ability- disability 
spectrum, our task is to become ever more mindful of the other(s) among us and to 
recognize the webs of connection in place of potential self-loathing or of rejection, 
disdain or fear of the unfamiliar/not related/unrelatable other. Such a potential is a 
blasphemy against God in whose image we are all created and by whose begetting us 
makes us members of a single family, more than neighbors, sisters and brothers all. 
And we need to confess the sins and the near occasions of these blasphemous sins 
against God, ourselves, and our siblings near and far. The radical dependence of 
being in the world belies autonomy and the “self-made man.”
Thus, when we turn to disability identity with a posture of humility, we may 
soon discover the magnificent diversity in the ways that persons become them-
selves and we may soon find them and ourselves beautiful. Consider the tendency 
of delight many of us experience at the sight of a majestic mountain scape, a 
field of wildflowers, a herd of buffalo, a night sky filled with stars, or the songs 
of wild birds. We marvel at nature’s diversity, but we may be stingy in recogniz-
ing diversity in humankind. In the world of dualistic segregations, superficially 
identifiable differences have been used to categorize and, invariably, establish 
hierarchies that ranked individuals and communities on the basis of their confor-
mity to a norm. In the case of human norms the dualisms of male/female, spirit/
body, white/non-white, heterosexual/homosexual, and non-disabled/disabled 
have designated de facto the second part of each pair as a defective version of the 
first part; those designations subsequently led to the oppression or patroniza-
tion of the second by the first. However, when diversity, inclusive of people with 
disability, is presumed as normative, these dualisms lose their power to elevate 
one expression of diversity, however narrow or large, over the diversity of other 
expressions. When diversity is normative dualisms no longer make sense and an 
anthropology of inclusion can emerge in their place.
3. Why “radical” bioethics?
3.1 Meanings and implications of Radicality
The Oxford English Dictionary offers three meanings of the term “radical,” each 
referring to the defining nature of someone or something as 1) fundamental or 
basic, essential, quintessential; 2) inherent or innate, intrinsic, structural; and 3) 
comprehensive or constitutive, organic, root [9]. I start with the notion of “radi-
cal” as root to agitate any personal complacence toward what we in the “west” 
have inherited as a hierarchy of being, at least since Linnaeus in the eighteenth 
century if not well before, with the 6th century BCE pre-Socratic philosophers to 
the Aristotelian trajectories in metaphysics of the 4th century BCE. Additionally, 
with the anti-racist, feminist, and LGBTQ critiques, I hold a view toward a socio-
political and theological kind of disruption about the taxonomic hierarchy and the 
subsequently normative ways of thinking about ourselves as members of the family 
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hominid, genus homo, and species Homo sapiens. I challenge determinations at the 
root of “Who Counts” as members of the human fold at the fundamental, inherent, 
and comprehensive levels of this hierarchy. And I challenge the agency that some 
members of the species have exercised in determining restrictively the agency of 
most others—those many others classified as marginal to the social, political, and 
religious, let alone the academic and professional elite.
I am suggesting a radical/root change in the way people with disability are 
perceived by many among the nondisabled community and the subsequent ways 
in which they—people with disability—are disabled by the social, medical, philo-
sophical, political, and theological constructions of non-normative “being” in the 
world. The idea of constructions that cohere with the now widely accepted rejec-
tions of and efforts to dismantle racial, ethnic, and gender biases is critical to the 
work of dismantling stereotypical assumptions about disability and about people 
with disability. Briefly, the social construction approach presents the contemporary 
critique of long-held-to-be true determinations about individuals and groups of 
“like” individuals such that all persons belonging to the class have uniform experi-
ences of “being” a Woman or Black or Indigenous or Gay … or Disabled. Moreover, 
individuals and the groups to which they have been “assigned” are stigmatized for 
being … women, non-Anglo, Native/Indigenous, Queer, and/or Disabled [10]. Thus, 
following the lead of people with disability and their co-agitators in the radical dis-
ability movement, my approach to disability has matured from a focus on individual 
problems experienced by individual persons with this or that particular impairment 
“to the wider oppression and social barriers that [have historically] excluded and 
disabled people” [11].
For all its efforts to promote autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
justice, bioethics is not immune to the inherited social constructions of disability. 
These constructions hold alongside the inherited assumptions about people with 
disability and the various ways in which they, people with disability, have been and 
continue to be calcified, categorized, and classified as, mostly, unfit to share space 
with the nondisabled. However, since none of us are immune from these inherited 
assumptions and their subsequent applications to real people, it is important to 
unpack the assumptions about disability for the dangers that lurk within them. 
Similarly, it is important to dismantle the oppressions that accompany the construc-
tions that build on these assumptions. Granted, none of us likes to think that we 
can be mistaken about the values inherent to this or other concepts (like beauty, 
strength, and adaptability). Nevertheless, glaring examples of the misappropria-
tion of personhood abound: for example, some of the handing down of religious 
practices from generation to generation were conducted under penalty of death 
if refused and, just as mistakenly, imperial conquests (e.g., by the Portuguese, 
Spanish, British, French, Chinese, Ottomans, and the United States) denied the 
humanity of many indigenous peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. Let us not 
be fooled. Many people today suffer enslavement in the form of human trafficking 
for exploited labor, organs, or reproductive service, and sex [12]. In ways similar to 
the contemporary enslavement of people who occupy places hidden from a decid-
edly prejudicial social history and from “polite” company, too few people register a 
thought about the similarly prejudicial, marginalizing, and oppressive experiences 
of people with disability.
With exceptions, people with disability have not been treated well. Their treat-
ment has been identified and outlined for us by social science academics, psychol-
ogy and nursing professionals, and humanities scholars in a system of models 
that distinguish one manner of treatment–with positive or negative effect—from 
another manner. Contemporary studies offer an approach to this history through 
the models of disability, developed by people with disability, that are related closely 
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to the ways in which the non-disabled and dominant codified their perceptions of 
people with disability according to the social roles to which they were assigned. The 
most common models of disability are the religious-moral model where individuals 
or their parents or communities are responsible for disability as a punishment from 
God for sin or sins committed; the medical model, which “conceptualizes disability 
as deviance and lack within the individual, and therefore all medical interventions 
are geared toward bringing the individual as close to normalcy as possible” [13]; 
and the social construction model of physical and attitudinal barriers of exclu-
sion, like stairs and inaccessible educational, commercial, health, political, or 
recreational opportunities. In addition to these three, other precisions have been 
offered with the tragedy/charity, expert/professional, rehabilitation, economic, 
and rights based, customer/empowering models [14]. Parallel to these models are 
social roles to which people with disability have been assigned as their being sick or 
sub-human, a menace, pitiable, a burden, holy innocent, inspirational, amusing, 
and a blessing [15]. Regardless of model or role, each of these assignments includes 
greater or lesser degrees of stigma: the defining mark of otherness that clears the 
way to marginalization and to greater or lesser degrees of direct marginalization, 
oppression, and violence [16]. The models offer a shorthand reference to under-
standing the presumptive attitudinal barriers that people with disability and their 
companions encounter all-too-frequently to this day [17].
As disability advocates remind us: “it’s important to remember here that 
throughout recorded history all forms of inequality, injustice, and oppression have 
been sanctioned in one way or another on the basis of assumptions of biological 
inferiority” [18]. Contemporary efforts to decry these injustices and to reject these 
assumptions, such as to include the perspectives and insights of people with dis-
ability, are rare and, when present devolve all-too-easily into patronizing thanks 
and nods. “Why, at almost the end of the second decade of the 21st century, are the 
[basic and fundamental] human rights of people with disability still ignored?” [19].
As suggested above, those with the power to make and shape societies have 
been grossly mistaken in their judgment about the inherent human value and 
dignity belonging to people with disability and others who do not conform to 
hegemonic norms. Those mistaken judgments are the bases of a history of mal-
treatment that people with disability have endured, a history that has been largely 
ignored and likely intentionally unrecorded; in effect, people with disability 
themselves and their stories of success and failure and of loves and losses have 
been silenced over the course of time. However, that culture of silence is no longer 
acceptable: the truth to be told is that newborns, infants, children, and adults have 
been neglected, abused, and exterminated on account of the presence of disability 
in their lives [20].
I now turn to the historically prevalent exclusion of people with disability to 
contextualize their experience and its residue in the main and in bioethics today.
3.2 A brief survey of historical experiences
With 15% to potentially 25% of people worldwide having one or more disability 
today (up to 1.75 billion of 7.6 billion people), it is undeniable that people with dis-
ability have been among the members of the human economy from antiquity to the 
present. Combining the models of disability (medical, moral, and social) to parallel 
social roles (menace, burden, clown), individuals were identified taxonomically as 
other. Given the lessons that contemporary retrievals of the historical experiences 
of many members of minority populations have uncovered, this “othering” of 
people with disability has resulted in their oppression as a class that, like racism and 
sexism, can no longer be tolerated.
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To the extent that those who have held power and authority record history, 
resolutions concerning people with disability resulted in their marginalization on 
account of the causes those powers presumed were at fault from: divine punishment 
for some sin (either one’s own or one’s parents) or a pre-emptive warning show of 
divine power; consorting with evil; an imbalance of humors; maternal stress during 
pregnancy; bestiality; menstruation; and astrology. Each of these causes encour-
aged perceptions that people with disability were more animal or otherworldly than 
human, that they could tolerate environmental extremes and malnutrition, and 
that they were dangerous to the societies in which they lived—conclusions that gave 
license to harm them with impunity by taming, exhibiting, sequestering, and worse.
Scandalously, many individuals with disabilities–feared and/or loathed by the 
non-disabled—would have been exposed at or near birth or otherwise ostracized 
once the presence of a disability became known [21]. Infanticide by exposure was 
widespread and, in some state-sponsored cultic systems, the practice was manda-
tory. Some early Greek medical texts instruct on recognizing defects at birth, in the 
first months, and early years so as to determine a child that is not worth raising [22]. 
Aristotle too recommended laws to prevent the rearing of “deformed” children and 
to deny deaf children access to schools, since they would burden the progress of the 
non-disabled children/boys of the community [23]. In Greco-Roman antiquity it 
would not have been uncommon for newborn girls or a newborn with observable 
disability to be abandoned or left in a crude cradle at a crossroads or near a market, 
gymnasium, or temple with some possibility of being taken (and likely enslaved), 
or tossed into a river by their patriarchs. Equally troubling and perhaps more hor-
rifying, some parents or overseers and other wardens, who depended on “income” 
from begging, would mutilate their biological or “adopted” children with disability 
to increase the pity-value that patrons might assess on them and thereby increase 
almsgiving to their cause of household maintenance [24]. Among other curiosities, 
the Roman gladiator games included the spectacle of fights between little people, 
the deaf, other people with varying disability, women, and animals. Less brutal 
but not less disturbing were practices that exhibited individuals with disability in 
courts of power: as a sign of blessing, entertainment, or pity to extend telethon-like 
charity.
The early medieval period made way for the custom of caring for the sick, those 
with disability, and the poor. Outside of the support of their natal homes, people 
with disability were reduced often to poverty and they resorted to begging as a 
principal means of income. Wanting to follow the example of Jesus, who attended 
to those who were marginalized for this or that stigma, Christians began to extend 
compassion on the less fortunate. By the height of the Middle Ages in Europe, a 
“period of organized beggary” led to guilds open to people with disability wherein 
leaders emerged, and rules and languages developed by guild members [25]. The 
guilds represent a welcome initiative by today’s standards. Yet, this same period saw 
the institution of “idiot cages” that kept people with disability confined, while the 
cage protected those beyond the bars. And where cages were insufficient or when 
the masses tired of this or that caged group, the “ship of fools” provided another 
form of distance to keep people with disability separate and exploited as members 
of a traveling carnival-horror-freak sideshow for port residents and visitors alike.
And then came the development of institutions. Founded as a result of a system 
of hostels for pilgrims on their way to a holy site for both blessings and cures, 
hospitals for the sick and incurable became asylums for the insane and invalid. 
With the advent of the Enlightenment project to reject the old and quaint in favor 
of a rational order, new scientific ways of conceiving the individual in society and 
the common good brought to the fore utopian concerns of a more perfect commu-
nion, overtly including an underlying concern for the dangers lurking in any near 
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presence of people with disability. The isolation of institutions provided safety for 
the non-disabled as well as it gave rise to better or worse care for those institutional-
ized where—up to and including the 21st century—as a captive population, they 
could be studied “objectively.” With concentrated access to people with a diverse 
array of disabilities, doctors and scientists began to investigate the causes of dis-
abilities using then newly advanced medical and empirical methodologies. Some of 
this early science fueled the later nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries’ 
eugenics movements through the subsequent sterilization of people with disability 
and other suspicious folk [26]. Consider the scientific “proofs” of a biological basis 
for the categories of race and the subsequent discrimination against non-white 
peoples, especially peoples of African descent, that labeled many deviant. People 
from Mediterranean countries and Asia were considered to be of “questionable 
genetic stock” and likely to increase the number of feebleminded or criminals 
that would become wards of the state; it would be better to prevent them from 
reproducing altogether [27]. As long as people were institutionalized and isolated 
from general human commerce, they were–and those who remain institutionalized 
are—vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, and other dehumanizing injustices.
The confluence of social progress, science, and rational self-interest led to 
the systematic individualization and medicalization of all persons–those deemed 
“normal” and those deemed “othered”—as subjects (the normalized) and as objects 
(the aberrant/abnormal/disabled). This systematic program led to a widespread 
ideology of disdain for, dis-ease with, and distrust of any who did not/do not con-
form to the hegemonically putative/normative/ideal modern man. By the twentieth 
century, eugenic initiatives were set in Europe and the United States with steriliza-
tion programs and final solutions in a murderous holocaust of untold, unnumbered, 
and unaccounted hundreds of thousands of people with disability. Scandalously 
still, eugenics and euthanasia by a different name continue apace with neonates, 
children, adolescents, and adults in their prime and elderly with disability as today’s 
principal populations that are vulnerable to medical-social-scientific control. While 
eugenics may not be institutionalized, it holds ideological power and is practiced 
widely in reproductive medicine and the selective abortion of fetuses. Similarly, 
euthanasia remains a threat as the contemporary equivalent of exposure by with-
holding life support from a person–neonate or adult—who could thrive if given the 
chance, not with heroic or extraordinary intervention but with the radical bioethics 
notion of ordinary care.
4. A disability-informed bioethics
4.1 Disability is multi-dimensional and multi-experiential
“Disability is a multi-dimensional concept, which should be understood in 
terms of a continuum” [28]. This continuum is true for all people once born and 
throughout the days of our lives. Even so, a disability continuum may have more 
dramatic punctuations than the general population. As such, bioethics attention to 
the multifaceted experiences of people with disability has the potential to integrate 
disability experiences in both critical interventionist care for things like substance 
abuse or cancers as well as the more mundane and presumably easier access to rou-
tine health checks and preventive holistic services like nutritional support, exer-
cise, education, and social interaction in arts and leisure and recreation. Bioethics 
will need to approach the subject with humility, since any attempts to categorize 
disability in generic terms will fail, especially since the human organism is itself 
complex; nevertheless, the phenomena of disability are expressed in the literature 
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as physical impairments, sensory impairments (e.g., blind and deaf), cognitive 
and/or developmental difficulties, mental health, and chronic illness.
While disability has been a feature of human life throughout the millennia, the 
contemporary climate suggests that the phenomena is rare or, if not rare, better to 
be left unspoken and closeted. The history above belies the rarity of disability and 
the suggestion that a culture of glamor or power or the accumulation of wealth is 
sufficient to disguise the presence, the challenges, the joys, the hopes and sorrows, 
as well as the contributions of persons with disability in ways grand and small 
yesterday and today [29]. The initiatives of the United Nations in its Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) are key for advancing the cause of 
recognition and self-determination for all people with disability. Although the 
United States has signed, it has not ratified the Convention and remains thereby 
not bound by its statutes. Article 4 notes nonetheless that “States Parties undertake 
to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on 
the basis of disability” [30]. The full realization of all human rights requires that 
persons with disabilities, like the nondisabled, have access to the basic goods of safe 
housing, potable water, nutritious food, education, family relations and friend-
ships, healthcare, employment, recreation, public services, and religious or other 
spiritual practice. Additionally, Article 10 reaffirms “that every human being has 
the inherent right to life and [States Parties] shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure its effective enjoyment by persons with disabilities on an equal basis with 
others” [31].
In 2001 the World Health Organization published the International Classification 
of Functioning, Disability, and Health (ICF) and in 2007 the ICF-CY (children and 
youth) as the framework for measuring health and disability at both individual and 
population levels. In these texts and in the related 2011 World Report on Disability, 
WHO conceptualizes a person’s level of functioning as a dynamic interaction 
between her or his health alongside environmental and personal factors, with a 
comprehensive basis for the definition and measurement of health and disability 
[32]. The idea of functioning as a measurement standard was inspired by the work 
of economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who developed 
the “capabilities approach” to discern an individual’s functional development and 
attainment of health [33]. In brief, the capabilities approach holds that all human 
beings have a virtual obligation to develop the abilities–inherent to each albeit 
in variable and disproportionate measure across the capability spectrum— as a 
positive natural right and the province of human initiative that lead, if given the 
opportunity, to flourishing and a good human life. Nussbaum articulates these 
capabilities as the basic human rights to acquire functional development of life: 
bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; concern for other species; play; and control over one’s 
environment [34].
As used in the ICF, the capabilities approach offers a holistic metric to deter-
minations of health and well-being based on individuals’ development of abilities 
aligned with the personal, local, regional, national, and global infrastructures—of 
educational, occupational, medical, recreational, and social opportunities—that 
are necessary to support that development. In matter-of-fact straightforwardness, 
WHO admits “Disability is part of the human condition” [35]. WHO argues further:
[The] ICF is named as it is because of its stress is on health and functioning, rather 
than on disability. Previously, disability began where health ended; once you were 
disabled, you were in a separate category. We want to get away from this kind of 
thinking. We want to make [the] ICF a tool for measuring functioning in society, no 
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matter what the reason for one’s impairments. So, it becomes a much more versatile 
tool with a much broader area of use than a traditional classification of health and 
disability.
This is a radical shift. From emphasizing people’s disabilities, we now focus on their 
level of [functioning and] health [36].
4.2 A radical shift in understanding disability
The ICF distinguishes between body functions, body structures, activities and 
participation, and environmental supports or lack thereof. To use the language of 
more common parlance: the functions reflect the purpose of mental, sensory, voice, 
organ, metabolic, reproductive, neural-muscular-skeletal, and skin systems; the 
structures refer to the engagement of procedures or steps involved with voluntary 
and involuntary movement. Activities and participation consider the degree to 
which individuals engage both functions and structures from cognition, affect, 
and locomotion, to self−/family−/community−/social−/civic-care. Environmental 
factors include considerations of the presence or absence of support for integral 
human development and flourishing.
Thus, given the complexities of functions and structures, disabilities fall into 
one or multiple classifications. In a similar vein, many people have co-occurring 
symptomatic dysfunctions, particular disabilities, and health complications 
with their primary mental, sensory, voice, organ, metabolic, muscular-skeletal 
disability. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the categories that 
qualify a person for accommodations of individualized support or relief are 
expressed in physical or mental impairments that interfere with major life activi-
ties [37]: Affective Disorders, Autism, Blindness, Cognitive Disability, Deafness, 
Emotional/Development Delay, Hearing Impairment, Intellectual Disability, 
Muscular/Physical/Skeletal Impairment, Neurological Impairment, Other Health 
Impairment, and Specific Learning Disability. These initiatives and legal precedents 
cohere with a baseline understanding of human capability that takes the contexts 
and particularities in which individuals and communities live as key to unlocking 
and supporting everyone’s basic human functioning capabilities. Nevertheless, 
“People with disability are characterized by low human and social capital” [38]. 
Thus, to consider health on the basis of functional capabilities development is both 
promising and dangerous for people with disability. Promising since focus is placed 
on the determinations of an individual’s capabilities and efforts in collaboration 
with social systems to develop those capabilities; dangerous since location will 
determine access to those necessary support systems. As a cause and consequence 
of disability, poverty remains the single most difficult obstacle to overcome, and 
poverty is directly related to an individual’s ability to both develop and then exer-
cise her/his basic functioning capabilities and thereby to thrive.
5. The difference of radical bioethics
The thing I propose as “radical” here is not in the sense of “protocol-be-damned” 
but in the more mundane and more nuanced frame of the ways in which a funda-
mental set of attitudes and actions can take hold in matters pertaining to bioethics 
in general, to the subject of disability and, more importantly, toward persons with 
disability in particular. The radical nature of this inquiry hearkens to the origins 
of the discipline of bioethics begun with the Hastings Center in New York (1969), 
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the Kennedy Institute for Ethics at Georgetown University (1971), and to Van 
Rensselaer Potter (1970), the oncologist who coined the term (at least in its English 
usage) [39]. Potter was particularly interested in the intersections and shared 
information of findings between the biological sciences and the humanities so as to 
ensure the benefits of research would yield results that attend to real persons and 
the eco-systems that support life: “global in scope, transdisciplinary in method, 
and, most importantly, compelled by a commitment to action that demanded per-
sonal engagement with social issues” [40]. This inquiry is radical in its adherence to 
the foundations of the discipline per Potter and our early colleagues at the Hastings 
Center and Kennedy Institute—many if not most of whom were trained as under-
graduate students in philosophical and/or theological disciplines and for whom the 
sciences of medical care and interventions were perforce designed for human health 
and the social good. Further, my project invites you to adopt this interdisciplin-
ary approach of a radical bioethics of dependence on the whole sphere of human 
commerce, with dependence as a normative key thereby for all persons inclusive of 
persons with disability across the millennia.
Difference is key to appreciating the diversity of persons and the perhaps 
even greater diversity of experiences among people with disability as equal to 
those among the general population. In order to ensure a comprehensive view, 
the insights of sociological critiques, which approach bioethics with quasi 
casuistry from the particularity and context of specific cases, offer a compelling 
argument that attends to lived experience, institutional culture, and structural 
injustice as the starting places to uncover the realities that honor persons with 
disability [41]. These approaches recognize that determinations of functioning 
capabilities depend upon considerations of interpersonal relations, institu-
tional structures, and the overall social world wherein the subjects of concern, 
whether persons with disability or women or people of color, are situated in real 
time and place.
Moreover, “We cannot reduce the complexity of disability to either a biologi-
cal problem, a psychological problem, or a social problem” [42]. All the factors 
of an individual’s life must be considered and interventions—of medical and 
rehabilitation kinds, assistive devices, psychological support, barrier removal, 
welfare benefits, legal protections, and cultural change—must be engaged at 
different and particular levels for the benefit of the individual in need of care 
(there is no one protocol that fits all persons adequately). As many in the field 
of Disability Studies argue forcefully, disability may present as a health concern, 
but it is more an issue of social and economic concern. As noted above, across 
the world people with disability lack access to basic health and rehabilitative ser-
vices as well as a lack of social support in the development of their basic human 
functioning capabilities. “They face barriers and prejudice, or poorer quality 
of healthcare. This [subpar access to care] means their health outcomes are 
worse—not as a result of their underlying impairments, but because of failures 
of [access to] general care” [43].
But what is difference at its root? Difference is a condition of being or a rela-
tion of distinction or diversity between one thing or person and another. An older 
Latin connotation points difference in the direction of diversity and is suggestive of 
variety, a point of dissimilarity but similar enough as to be recognizable as this or 
that thing or person. I have argued that diversity is the distinguishing feature of all 
creation, human beings included [44]. And I argue that diversity is the signature of 
God’s handiwork throughout the known world and beyond. I recognize this diver-
sity as God’s own “calling card” and the way that God, in the Christian tradition, 
reveals Godself to us in relation with self and with others.
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6. Radical bioethics: desiderata
I have long avoided the question of desire in Ref. to interrogating my own life 
and its wondrously circuitous and amazing turns except to ponder the opportuni-
ties given alongside the choices made that brought me to this moment in time, 
and to give thanks. I’ve led a charmed life, not without roadblocks here and there 
but, charmed, nonetheless. For an even more conscious period of time, I have 
avoided the question of desire in Ref. to the lives of people with disability. I like 
to think that this avoidance is rooted in a posture of humility by virtue of not 
knowing in any intimate sense what life is like in another person’s shoes. I cannot 
truly fathom another person’s “longing for something lost or missed,” “to feel the 
loss of,” or “to be wanting” [45], the root meaning of desire. Nevertheless, I am 
drawn now into this subject in recognition of the sad history of medical and social 
treatment that people with disability have experienced across the millennia—
from exposure to bullying, abuse, and murder—and to conversations that many 
academics, medical professionals, and policy makers have regarding the spoken 
and unspoken assumptions that “they”/people with disability would be better off 
dead. I am drawn also into the subject of desiderata by genuine calls initiated by 
some persons with disability and their family members, friends, and caregivers 
for interventions that promise rightly to relieve some of the conditions—espe-
cially physical pain and the internalized suffering of rejection—that compromise 
human flourishing.
“Disability, in everyday thought, is associated with failure, with dependency, 
and with not being able to do things. [Many of the nondisabled] imagine it must 
be miserable to be disabled. [But] both empirical evidence and anecdotal testi-
mony reveals that for many people with disabilities, life is surprisingly good” [46]. 
Moreover, when asked, many people with lifelong disability say, “we don’t want to 
be cured.” For many, except for bouts of pain (it is initially very different for people 
who acquire disability in their teen and adult years), their lives are fulfilling the way 
they are and their disability is part of their identities such that it is near impossible 
to envision a life without disability. “The medical focus of cure and change [is] 
linked to an assumption that disabled people want to be cured. … The dominant 
discourse fail[s] to recognize disability as a desired differentness, which can be core 
to an individual’s identity” [47].
Despite the best of intentions of family members and caregivers, like the non-
disabled, persons with disability are themselves the principal subjects of their own 
lives and desires and they are thereby entitled to the exercise of autonomy. I am pre-
suming a degree of cognitive and communicative autonomy that may be absent on 
account of age or developmental disability. Age aside, unfortunately, their desires 
were rarely taken into account across the standard practices of paternalism, such 
that past discussions in the medical arena on life with disability were often limited 
to questions of “to treat or not to treat” (and to let die) [48]. Today, with increasing 
Disability Rights Advocacy and given the voices of people with disability on the 
subject of cure, questions of intervention point more directly toward facilitating 
life with disability through barrier removal alongside of relief for sickness when 
autoimmune responses or influenza or cancer or diabetes or other calamity present. 
Thus, not unlike preferred choices when it comes to the dinner menu, decisions 
regarding this or that intervention, care protocol, or cure demand the exercise of 
personal autonomy and must be solicited from persons with disability in as equally 
an informative measure and accessible language as are decisions solicited from the 
nondisabled: the desires of people with disability must be honored.
As I return then to desiderata, a minimum desire among the communities 
of people with disability is to recognize their agency. Granted, the spectrum of 
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conditions that qualify as disabling are themselves diverse and often overlapping, 
both identity and agency diversities will emerge between physical, cognitive, 
and developmental disabilities but social stigma—the historically definitive 
construction of people with disability as inferior “to the main” and, as such, 
“other”—remains a common experience across the spectra. The de-construction of 
stigmatizing “otherness” remains the principal desiderata of my work. From that 
recognition, the tangible desires voiced by people with disability include minimally 
[49]: 1) the removal of barriers both physical and attitudinal to wholesale inclusion 
throughout the many avenues of social commerce—oppression remains the single 
most problematic of personal barriers to overcome; 2) reasonable accommodations 
to facilitate participation (e.g., accessible communication formats like sign lan-
guage, braille, and illustrations); 3) an overall slower pace in language and in move-
ment from place to place and for task to task; 4) attention and equitable access to 
basic and critical healthcare, education, and employment; and perhaps most of all 
5) friendship and other personal relationships beyond kith and kin in educational, 
social, commercial, employment, political, recreational, and religious arenas.
What else is to be desired?
Since many disabilities are acquired over the course of a person’s life, prevention 
of disabling impairments is an obvious desire. Hence, practical initiatives to reduce 
acquired disability include hard hats and other protective gear for manual laborers, 
immunizations from communicable diseases, reduction of exposure to hazardous 
materials, balanced diet for all and nutritional support especially for women who 
are pregnant or planning pregnancy, moderate alcohol and other “recreational” 
drug consumption, respect for speed limits and traffic conditions, avoidance 
of violent games and guns. We delude ourselves into thinking that any of us are 
immune from any of these eventualities.
On immediately practical and tangible levels, people with disability globally 
face obstacles to living and to living well that many of us see only as voyeurs during 
newscasts or from charity appeals for help. But the daily needs of most people with 
disability are embarrassingly simple: mobility aids like wheelchairs and rollators, 
barrier removal, reliable electricity, access to potable water, protein and carbohy-
drate, contained human and animal waste, basic healthcare and primary education. 
Let us recognize that meeting the desires of people with disability is not rocket sci-
ence but, until we break free of these attitudinal and ideological barriers to recogni-
tion that people with disability are people first, these basic needs of common goods 
remain out of reach. It’s rather simple to admit, but not easy to make the changes 
necessary for a tomorrow that all can better enjoy.
7. Concluding thoughts on radical bioethics
I started this work with an invitation to consider today’s more than one billion 
people with disability as one of the most diverse populations—15% to potentially 
25% of the 7.6 billion people worldwide. This population is a mass of people rel-
egated to the margins of the larger social groupings to which they belong. In a time 
when gender, race, and bio-ecological diversity are championed and barriers to 
inclusion dismantled for some, the margins of human commerce to which many if 
not most people with disability are consigned are no longer tolerable.
Truth be told, medical and healthcare professionals have approached care 
concerning persons with disability with a jaded view and a jaded past regard-
ing their worth as marginal at best or their status as less than deserving of either 
routine or critical care. In response, I suggest, this “radical bioethics” that 1) invites 
healthcare and bioethics professionals to recognize that a patient with disability 
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is a patient first; 2) points to a lack of attention on the part of these professionals 
and the discipline of bioethics to be aware of the similarities and differences that 
disability presents in deliberations of treatment protocols; and 3) as WHO admits, 
“from emphasizing people’s disabilities, we [have made a radical shift to] now focus 
on their level of [functioning and] health.” Thus, following the lead of members 
of the communities of disability who have engaged legal argumentation on behalf 
of their vulnerable sisters and brothers with disability who have not received a fair 
hearing regarding their care, this disability consciousness is best informed before 
considerations about medical interventions available to persons with disability are 
pronounced.
As Professor of Law and Bioethics Alicia Ouellette observes:
“bioethicists tend to support individual choices to refuse medical care, family 
decision making, and advance directives. Members of the disability community are 
often skeptical of or opposed to these practices. Some disability experts view medi-
cally assisted nutrition and hydration as a basic human right; bioethicists tend to 
think of medically assisted nutrition and hydration as no different from other medi-
cal treatments [that may be withheld or withdrawn]. Bioethicists support efforts 
of doctors to “fix” physical impairments; disability scholars question the need to 
“fix” the bodies of individuals with disability and look instead for societal solutions. 
Many bioethicists view persistent vegetative state as something entirely different 
from other disabling conditions; some disability activists deny those differences. 
[And] many people in bioethics seek to resolve individual cases without taking into 
account social and community concerns, whereas social and community concerns 
are central to the disability community” [50].
Desiderata.
And a final word regarding the title of this work. Philosopher and lawyer Max 
Ehrmann wrote the poem “Desiderata” in 1927, it was published posthumously 
in 1948. Its popularity may have waned of late but we human beings continue to 
burn with desires/desiderata of many kinds, some mundane and others profound. 
Whatever the desires of people with disability, their family members, friends, those 
who care for and about them, and those who do not, I think we can take Ehrmann’s 
word to head and heart in our strivings for a better tomorrow:
Go placidly amid the noise and haste, and remember what peace there may be in 
silence.
As far as possible, without surrender, be on good terms with all persons.
Speak your truth quietly and clearly;
And listen to others, even to the dull and ignorant; they too have their story.
…
Beyond a wholesome discipline, be gentle with yourself.
You are a child of the universe, no less than the trees and the stars;
[And] you have a right to be here.
…
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